Time for a Paradigm Shift: From Economic Growth andPrice-Making Markets to Social Ecological Economics by Spash, Clive L.
Multilevel Governance and Development
 Clive L. Spash
SRE-Discussion-2019/07 2019
Time for a Paradigm Shift: From Economic Growth and
Price-Making Markets to Social Ecological Economics
Time for a Paradigm Shift: 
From Economic Growth and Price-Making Markets to Social Ecological Economics1 
by 
Clive L. Spash 
Institute for the Multi-Level Governance & Development,  
Department of Socioeconomics,  
WU Vienna University of Economics and Business,  
Gebäude D4, Welthandelsplatz 1,  
1020 Vienna, Austria 
 
 
Abstract 
Ecological economics has ontological foundations that inform it as a paradigm both 
biophysically and socially. It stands in strong opposition to mainstream thought on the 
operations of the economy and society. The core arguments deconstruct and oppose both 
growth and price-making market paradigms. However, in contradiction of these theoretical 
foundations, ecological economists can be found who call upon neoclassical economic theory 
as insightful, price-making and capitalist markets as socially justified means of allocation and 
economic growth as achieving progress and development. The more radical steady-state and 
post-growth/degrowth movements are shown to include confused and conflicted stances in 
relation to the mainstream hegemonic paradigms. Ecological economics personally challenges 
those trained in mainstream theory to move beyond their orthodox education and leave behind 
the flawed theories and concepts that contribute to supporting systems that create social, 
ecological and economic crises. This paper makes explicit the paradigmatic struggle of the 
past thirty years and the need to wipe away mainstream apologetics, pragmatic conformity 
and ill-conceived postmodern pluralism. It details the core paradigmatic conflict and specifies 
the alternative social ecological economic paradigm along with a new research agenda. 
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1. Introduction 
Can ecological economics be described as having a core set of ideas around which the 
knowledge base is constructed? What are the key problématiques that are being addressed? 
How should ecological economists go about addressing them? What are the objects of study 
for ecological economists? Answers to these types of questions define a paradigmatic field of 
knowledge (see Appendix A). Despite different initial visions and the emergence of distinct 
camps, considerable progress has been made in providing answers and identifying a 
paradigmatic core for ecological economics. Incompatibility with mainstream economics is 
fundamental, not least on ontological grounds, which include the implications of biophysical 
reality for energy and material flows and the operation of economic and social systems. 
The foundational critiques of economic growth, based on physics as advanced by 
Georgescu-Roegen (1971), stand in opposition to the macroeconomic growth paradigm and 
its belief in human progress through competition, innovation, technology and capital 
accumulation. The incorporation of ecological concepts and understanding of ecosystems add 
to this physically based critique of economics and emphasise that quality, not just scale, of 
throughput must be addressed (Spash and Smith 2019). How Nature and society are 
interrelated raises issues of non-monetary valuation, plural values, incommensurability and 
alternative meta-ethical systems (O'Neill, Holland, and Light 2007); all of which challenge 
neoclassical price theory (Kapp 1978 [1963]). Ethics and value theory are central to economic 
understanding, not a problematic normative add-on to a naïvely objective, positivistic science. 
On the social science side there are a variety of contributions standing in opposition to the 
mainstream, including psychological theories of motivation, feminist insights into 
exploitation, critical institutionalist approaches to markets, and Marxist theories of social 
relations of production. 
The unifying call is for a new economic paradigm (Spash 2011; Gowdy and Erickson 
2005), with a variety of suggested formulations including steady-state (Daly 1992), degrowth 
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(Kallis, Kerschner, and Martinez-Alier 2012; Martinez-Alier et al. 2010), post-growth 
(Jackson 2009a; Paech 2017), eco-socialism (Burkett 2006; Douai 2017) and ecofeminism 
(Salleh 2017; Perkins 1997; Perkins and Kuiper 2005). Society President, Joshua Farley, 
makes explicit that steady-state economics refutes the key assumptions upon which 
neoclassical economics (NCE) is built (Farley and Washington 2018: 447) and the need to 
“move away from NCE” (ibid: 446). However, the move beyond neoclassical economics has 
been hesitant and incomplete. Those trained in neoclassical theory continue to teach and use it 
as the central reference point for understanding the economy, while non-economists do 
likewise for pragmatic reasons, simply because of its paradigmatic dominance. What could 
help here is to clarify the paradigmatic revolutionary struggle in which ecological economists 
are engaged. 
A core radical aspect of ecological economics is the rejection of the growth paradigm (a 
term attributed to Daly 1972). The work of Georgescu-Roegen (1971, 1995 [1979], 2009 
[1975]) forms a key reference point, but as part of a larger growth critical economics literature 
of the 1970s (e.g., Meadows et al. 1972; Hirsch 1977; Schumacher 1973; Scitovsky 1976; 
Daly 1973). This literature signalled the end of the post-War unquestioning commitment to 
growth, but not its dominance as an economic goal (Schmelzer 2015: 268). By the 1980s, 
amongst economists, Herman Daly was holding the anti-growth fort almost single-handed, 
until the rise of modern ecological economics. The 2008 crash brought growth and capitalism 
under more widespread economic critique again. However, today, capital accumulating 
growth rhetoric remains strong. For example, in 2019 over 3000, mainly American, 
economists, including twenty-seven Sveriges Riksbank (‘Nobel’) Prize winners, endorsed a 
‘carbon tax’ because “[s]ubstituting a price signal for cumbersome regulations will promote 
economic growth”.2 The October 2015 UN Resolution A/RES/70/1, ‘Transforming our world: 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’, set down international ‘sustainable 
                                                 
2 Economists statement on carbon dividends. https://www.econstatement.org/ Accessed 7th May 2019. 
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development goals’ (SDGs) including Goal 8 to sustain per capita economic growth at a rate 
of ‘at least 7 per cent gross domestic product per annum in the least developed countries’; a 
proposition in direct conflict with the Paris Agreement made by the same countries two 
months later (Spash 2016). Indeed, claims of ‘climate emergency’ are being employed to 
promote a new climate economy based on Green growth, backed by high profile “Better 
Growth, Better Climate” reports from Lord Stern and the Davos elite (see Spash 2014). That 
apologia for growth also appear in this journal should be seen as a fundamental contradiction 
of the foundations of ecological economics. 
Daly explicitly recognised something was going wrong when he resigned from the 
Swedish Beijer Institute. This Institute had rebranded itself in 1990 as Ecological Economics, 
while applying mainstream economic theory and approaches under Board chair Partha 
Dasgupta. As Daly has stated, with respect to this experience: “I felt it was a kind of take-
over—here is something called Ecological Economics, it is beginning to get a little following, 
it might get in the way some day, let’s just take it over” (quoted by Røpke 2005: 272). Since 
then the potential for a general ‘takeover’ has been an ever present issue (Spash 2013a). Yet, 
the reluctance to complete the divorce from the mainstream remains, even amongst critical 
voices (e.g., Daly, Farley, Norgaard, Kallis, Jackson) and alternatives such as steady-state and 
degrowth/post-growth (as discussed in Sections 2 and 4). 
Instead, the extent to which the critical theoretical insights of ecological economics 
create a divorce from the dominant paradigms of ‘normal’ economic science has been 
repeatedly downplayed (Spash 2013b; Anderson and M'Gonigle 2012). Mainstream economic 
theories, concepts, methods and methodology appear as if unproblematic in an eclectic 
pluralism. The result is contradiction, with opposing positions being simultaneously 
promoted: the application of monistic monetary valuation and value pluralism; developing 
measures of adjusted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) while opposing growth as a means to 
well-being; criticising commodification and the functioning of the price mechanism while 
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supporting an institutional theory of self-regulating markets; recognising society as emergent 
and complex while adopting methodological individualism; and advancing multiple criteria 
and needs while regarding optimal (Pareto) allocative efficiency as the outcome of markets. In 
hindsight, strategic and pragmatic concerns can be seen as having opened the door to the 
absorption of the fledgling ecological economics movement into the very paradigm it had set 
out to reform. 
In this struggle, neoclassical economics forms an identifiable paradigm, and does so 
despite on-going disputes over who is in/out of the neoclassical camp and what is 
core/peripheral to the school of thought. Indeed, those very disputes are indicative of a failing 
‘normal science’, facing paradigm collapse, due to discord over how to address an ever 
growing list of anomalies. Ideologically driven paradigm defence is evident in the 
increasingly narrow mathematically formalist education of economists, which escalates 
professional ignorance and dogmatism. Alternative economic theories are then marginalised 
for strategic, not scientific, reasons, and radicals isolated (Lee 2009). 
Understanding where ecological economics stands relative to this paradigm provides the 
key for going forward (Spash 2011), and defining the future research agenda. Already 
distinctive groupings of researchers have been recognised and theorised (Spash 2012b, a, 
2013b) and empirically investigated (Spash and Ryan 2012). This reveals ecological 
economics as divided amongst three main camps: New Resource Economists, broadly 
following mainstream (neoclassical) economics; New Environmental Pragmatists, adopting 
tools and methods deemed useful regardless of theoretical concerns or scientific rigour and 
validity; and Social Ecological Economists, seeking a theoretically coherent and epistemically 
sound approach that rejects flawed economic concepts and theories on scientific grounds 
(Spash 2013b). This last position recognises that ecological economics does have a distinct 
core, and that it can be based on a critical and realist philosophy of science. 
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Social Ecological Economics recognises the need for paradigmatic synthesis, greater 
unity and integration of knowledge, especially bringing in better understanding of the social 
(e.g., agency-structure debates, the meaning and role of power, social movements, social 
provisioning, social justice) and the importance of having a social theory, especially relating 
to structural change. However, Social Ecological Economics also recognises that a range of 
shared, socially relevant, ontological commitments already exist. Reality is recognised as 
consisting of an hierarchical structure with the economy emergent from and embedded in 
social relations, while social and economic systems are also subject to biophysical structures 
and their law like conditions. Complex systems and their interactions create emergent 
properties, unpredictable consequences and continual change,3 and are not explicable or 
realistically describable as having self-regulating equilibria. Humans as social animals rely 
upon instituted processes for coordination (e.g. varieties of markets), where institutions are 
understood as conventions, norms, rules and regulations (Vatn 2005). Humans hold plural and 
incommensurable values that conflict. Social stability requires means of conflict resolution 
that address power relations. These then are some of the core social realities. 
Such common ontological commitments define disciplinary understanding informing a 
structured methodological pluralism. They designate what constitutes scientifically 
meaningful conceptualisations of what form the objects of study for ecological economists. 
Foundations provide the basis for unity, coherence and integration (Spash 2012a). This is not 
to deny fallibilism, or the need to remain critically open to ideas to avoid dogmatism, nor to 
advocate ideological purity, fundamentalism, naïve objectivism or foundationalism. It is to 
advocate the need for a basic common understanding and one that entails a revolutionary 
emergent paradigm to replace mainstream economics, i.e., a paradigm shift. 
Kuhn (1970 [1962]) developed the concept of a scientific paradigm to capture how 
scientific knowledge is created by a community of researchers (see Appendix A). His concept 
                                                 
3 Knowledge is possible because not everything changes all the time and there exist essential aspects of 
continuity. 
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of a paradigm describes group consensus during a period when science is normalised. He 
often applied the term very loosely to different collectives of researchers (Norton 1995: 124). 
He contrasted periods of ‘normal science’ with periods of revolutionary scientific change, 
when paradigms are in flux, as old ones collapse and new ones appear. The usefulness of the 
concept of a paradigm in what follows is less in terms of the specifics of Kuhn’s theory and 
more in terms of the general understanding it offers.4 Identifying core ‘normal’ economic 
paradigms allows analysis of how they are being maintained against the evidence of their 
failure. This relates to the creation of dominant ideas in society about the economy, which 
must additionally work through relations of power between groups (e.g., Buch-Hansen 2018). 
The aim of this paper is to make explicit how ecological economics can be understood as a 
scientific power struggle, and to clarify the paradigmatic basis of that struggle. 
Next, some lessons from the first thirty years of ecological economics are explored in 
terms of identifying the presence of competing paradigms and boundary disputes with specific 
focus on this journal (Section 2.2) and the main textbooks in ecological economics (Section 
2.3). Two economic paradigms, relating to growth and price-making markets, are then 
introduced and distinguished (Section 3). Opposition to economic growth, informing the 
development of steady-state and degrowth/post-growth ideas, is well established. Less 
recognised as paradigmatically problematic is the ideology of price-making markets as the 
best institution for organising human social relations,5 which is then critically explained in 
more detail. Why a third paradigm, Social Ecological Economics, has remained emergent, 
even within ecological economics itself, is argued to derive from pragmatism and passive 
revolutions (Section 4). Examples are given of how leading steady-state (Section 4.1) and 
degrowth/post-growth (Section 4.2) researchers acquiesce to the mainstream paradigms, 
                                                 
4 A similar point is made by Schmelzer (2015) in his work on the history of the growth paradigm. 
5 Price-making markets, is a term I use throughout this paper, based on Polanyi (1957). This form of market has 
prices resulting from ‘negotiations’ between actors (e.g., firms-consumers; employer-employee) in contrast to 
being set by an administrative, or other, authority. All markets are recognised to be social constructions, 
institutionally defined and subject to power relations. In neoclassical and neo-Austrian theory the price-making 
market is typically regarded to be ‘self-regulating’. 
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despite resulting contradictions. The penultimate discussion (Section 5), before some 
concluding remarks (Section 6), outlines core aspects of the emerging alternative paradigm 
and sketches a vision of the related future research agenda. 
 
2. Lessons from the First Thirty Years 
Since the first meeting of the International Society for Ecological Economics (ISEE) at the 
World Bank, Washington D.C., in 1990 there have been a lot of changes and clarifications as 
to both meaning and direction of what was then a new professional organisation. The ISEE 
was initially heavily oriented towards North America, and this was evident both at the 
inaugural conference and in the initial Board of the journal (23 of 40 Board posts plus the 
editor-in-chief and one of the three associate editors were North Americans). However, 
membership quickly spread through regional associations. The establishment of the European 
Society for Ecological Economics (ESEE) in 1996 led to negotiations in Santiago, Chile, in 
1998, which concluded with a new constitution that recognised the importance of the regional 
societies. Shortly after a United States society (USSEE) was established. This meant ISEE 
became a diverse multinational, regional, membership organisation. Diversity also meant 
difference, not least concerning disciplinary inclusiveness and pluralism. 
 
2.1 Pluralism, Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity 
The role of pluralism in a coherent scientific body of knowledge is an area where ecological 
economics has struggled to develop better understanding. The openness of ecological 
economists to any ‘methods’ available, regardless of disciplinary context, was advocated early 
on as a form of transdisciplinarity (Costanza 1991), and combined with an indiscriminate 
pluralism in which inclusion of mainstream economic theory was seen as strategically 
important (Norgaard 1989). Eclecticism led to entertaining diametrically opposed 
epistemologies from positivism and naïve objectivism to relativism and strong social 
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constructivism. Ecological economics has then been labelled both as a subfield of mainstream 
neoclassical economics (Hoepner et al. 2012), in a modern positivist tradition, and a post-
normal science (Silva and Teixeira 2011), in a postmodern constructivist tradition. Confusion 
has reigned in these muddied epistemological waters. 
Plurality of methods is not necessarily a problem, but methods used for scientific 
purposes should be appropriate for addressing the research question and object of study. 
Structured methodological pluralism has been recommended to avoid eclecticism (Spash 
2012a; Dow 2007), and can guide use of methods, avoiding those incompatible with the core 
ontology. Unfortunately, methods may be adopted that are inappropriate purely because they 
suit a strategic purpose, or conform to a paradigm. One result is the epistemic fallacy, i.e. the 
belief that understanding and describing reality is consistent with the method of seeking 
knowledge (Collier 1994). An example would be imposing tools of monetary valuation and 
then claiming, if something cannot be measured in this way, it has no value and so does not 
constitute an object of study for economists, i.e., does not exist economically. The epistemic 
fallacy entered ecological economics due to the strong initial drive for cooperation with 
neoclassical environmental and resource economists, who employ deductive mathematical 
models and universally apply cost-benefit analysis (CBA). That is, their methodology and 
methods define their conceptualisation of reality. 
As ecologists’ brought their own models and methods to the table, a practical way 
forward was to adopt the methodology of a linkage approach, where unreconstituted models 
from ecology and neoclassical economics were essentially bolted together. This was perhaps a 
more natural approach for those working from a complex systems perspective, which was 
then dominant in ecology. However, a multidisciplinary ‘ecology and economics’ approach 
could not fulfil the promise of ecological economics, or what had been recognised as the 
necessity for ‘new ways of thinking’ (Costanza, 1989: 1). The approach also contrasted with 
the interdisciplinarity of the social economists joining the field, and became an evident 
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epistemological and methodological division between North American and European 
ecological economists (Spash 1999). 
Interdisciplinarity means critically engaging in different fields of knowledge, as 
providing alternative perspectives on an object of study, with the aim of reaching integration 
and new interpretations. The challenge of going even further into a transdisciplinary approach 
was interpreted weakly as borrowing whatever methods/tools were deemed necessary for 
‘problem solving’ (Costanza 1991). In contrast, strong transdisciplinarity requires both 
interdisciplinary critical thought and extending to a wider peer community, including 
stakeholders and members of the lay public (Luks and Siebenhuner 2007). Such strong 
transdisciplinarity was most popularly propounded in ecological economics by post-normal 
science, being described as “the democratization of knowledge by an extension of the peer-
community for quality assurance” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1994: 198). More common, in 
practice, was the rhetoric of weak transdisciplinarity and the application of mono, or at best 
multi, disciplinarity, and this is clear from looking at the ISEE’s journal. 
 
2.2 The Flagship ISEE Journal: Pragmatism and Sociology of Science 
Established in 1989, the journal Ecological Economics is regarded as influential because it 
has a high citations ranking (Web of Science top 6% in economics, 2017). Initially there were 
four and then six (1991), then nine (1994) and finally twelve (1995) issues per year. From 
publishing nineteen research papers in the first year (1989), and seventy-six when moving to 
twelve issues, the journal published 387 articles in 2018.6 If growth in scale is success, then 
the journal has been successful. If the concern is quality and progress in a field of knowledge, 
then some serious concerns arise about the direction taken in what (ironically) appears as 
commercialised exponential growth. Initially, for example, articles were peer reviewed by an 
                                                 
6 During the first decade each ordinary issue typically had four research papers per issue. Today each issue varies 
wildly in terms of number of research papers; for example in 2019 the January issue had nine articles and the 
March issue thirty eight. 
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ecologist and an economist, but this attempt at stimulating interdisciplinary integration soon 
disappeared. Expansion has been sustained by publishing diverse material tied loosely 
together on the basis of addressing environmental issues. Justification as a form of pluralism 
is evident in the metaphor of a ‘big tent’, put forward by Rich Howarth (2008) as editor-in-
chief. The well intentioned ideal appears to be one of integration via engagement of diverse 
positions, but in the absence of any mechanisms to achieve this the result has been an 
acceptance of diversity for its own sake and a loss of focus. 
Perhaps most worryingly, the journal has attracted and published increasing quantities 
of neoclassical economics the more it has expanded in size. As Anderson and M'Gonigle 
(2012: 40) complain: 
“Rather than challenging mainstream economics, or laying the foundation for new 
economic paradigms, the field's seed journal widely employs and reinforces the 
concepts, assumptions, models and solutions that are used in the journals of 
environmental economics.” 
This has not resulted in any progressive pluralism, debate or exchange of ideas, but merely the 
increasing encroachment of unreconstituted neoclassical economics that pays no attention to 
even the periphery, let alone the core, of ecological economic ideas. As Farley and 
Washington (2018: 448) note: 
“we, like many other ecological economists, including Herman Daly, are disappointed 
that the field of Ecological Economics appears to be drifting away from its core 
principles. In particular, the Journal Ecological Economics is increasingly filled with 
articles applying the theory and methods of NCE [neoclassical economics], or what 
Spash (2012a, 2013b) refers to as the ‘new resource economics’. 
Indeed, the criteria for epistemological advance seem lacking and rather than facilitating the 
promise of a paradigm shift the approach has been undermining its potential by empowering 
those opposed to such a change. 
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Indeed, the Board of the journal has become constituted of paradigmatically divided 
positions.7 Board members include those arguing that ecological economics is close to 
neoclassical resource economics (Turner, Perrings, and Folke 1997), those calling for it to be 
retitled as “Sustainability Economics” in order to repair the “unfortunate divide between 
ecological economics and environmental and resource economics in the study of 
sustainability” (Baumgärtner and Quaas 2010: 449); those seeing no real gap between it and 
mainstream economics (van den Bergh 2010: 2051); and those who are often highly critical of 
but still wish to include neoclassical economics (Söderbaum 1990; Norgaard 1989). These are 
merely indicative references to Board members who include in their work apologia for the 
necessity of maintaining the presence of mainstream economics. Other Board members 
support a radically different position that raises issues of social injustice, political economy 
and human-Nature relationships in a way that denies the relevance of mainstream economics. 
This is as highlighted by: ecofeminist calls for “a new theoretical vision of an economy which 
is socially and ecologically sustainable” (Perkins 1997: ); linking academic theory to political 
practice (Perkins and Kuiper 2005; Healy et al. 2013); advocating a radically alternative 
degrowth economy as a new paradigm (Martinez-Alier et al. 2010); arguing for a total 
reorientation of economics towards needs (Cruz, Stahel, and Max-Neef 2009), and identifying 
the basic ecological insights that inform a new paradigm (Norton 1995). 
How these apparent tensions play out can be indicated by some empirical research. 
Plumecocq (2014) conducted discourse analysis of 6308 abstracts published between 1989 
and 2013 to compare Ecological Economics with neoclassical environmental economics. His 
results show the increasing encroachment of environmental economics with the use of such 
concepts as ecosystem services and the practice of monetary valuation. He argues that: “this 
trend is parallel to Costanza's career-path, which suggests the rise of a tacit recognition of the 
                                                 
7 Board Membership taken from the inside cover as of April 2019. Board members included in the references 
cited are: Baumgärtner, Folke, Martinez-Alier, Max-Kneef, Norgaard, Norton, Perkins, Perrings, Söderbaum, 
Turner, and van den Bergh. The strong gender bias reflects that of the Board itself, which has consistently been 
overwhelmingly male dominated. 
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New Environmental Pragmatic scientific approach” (Plumecocq 2014: 457). This is further 
supported by Söderbaum (2007: 622-623) who notes that during a workshop, on ‘Ecology in a 
Cost–Benefit Society’ held in 2004, “Costanza argued in favour of a pragmatic position where 
CBA is not excluded: If CBA can be used to convince people about the importance of 
environmental issues, then we should not hesitate to use this approach”. Plumecocq’s 
conclusion is important for two reasons: (i) the role pragmatism has played in ecological 
economics and how this creates alliances with both the mainstream in economics and neo-
liberal ideology in society; (ii) the role it attributes to a sociology of science and the potential 
influence of key interests and actors on a field of knowledge. 
New Environmental Pragmatism is distinct from the philosophical school of American 
Pragmatism, which has roots in the realism of Charles Saunders Peirce (Spash 2013b). It 
should be recognised as a more general phenomenon of recent decades, spread across 
environmental non-governmental organisations, ecology and conservation (Spash 2009). The 
position holds that society is now money obsessed, growth oriented, based on price-making 
markets and there are no alternatives. Therefore the agenda is to use methods of monetary 
valuation, make growth Green, get the prices right and ignore alternatives. Indeed, the idea of 
alternatives to the price-making markets of capitalism is itself removed from the research 
agenda with talk of ‘the economy’, as if there were only one possible institutional form for 
social provisioning and allocation. Theoretical rigour is undermined by New Environmental 
Pragmatism, and even those confessing sympathy with the approach are “deeply concerned 
that an emphasis on monetary values and market-based instruments could backfire” (Farley 
and Washington 2018: 448). If taken seriously, claims of usefulness would require assessing 
what such an approach has achieved, failed to do and prevented from happening! Advocates 
would also need to be aware of how pragmatism is used by power elites to achieve their own 
ends (see Section 4). 
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In terms of the sociology of ecological economics, the second point drawn from 
Plumecocq’s analysis, the most extensive review is that of Røpke (2004, 2005), who employs 
the sociological theory of a ‘reputational organisation’ to evaluate the fields development. 
Amongst other things, she notes the tension between ‘mainstream’ economists and their 
sympathisers, and ‘socio-economic’ researchers. Her conclusions make two key points 
concerning the future of ecological economics: 
“One risk is that the field becomes uninteresting as a field, if identity is lost by the 
acceptance of anything as being justified because of transdisciplinarity. […] Another 
risk (others would call it a chance) is that the field loses its bite and becomes a sub-field 
of neoclassical environmental and resource economics modelling links between 
ecosystems and the economy.” (Røpke 2005: 287) 
The first concern relates to a shallow transdisciplinarity, and the advocacy of an eclectic 
pluralism that is the antithesis of creating knowledge (Spash 2012a; Dow 2007). The second 
raises the issue of conflicting paradigms and the threat of mainstream economic imperialism. 
Røpke (2005) finds several substantive weaknesses in ecological economics as a ‘reputational 
organisation’, including: poor and unsystematic organisation of the knowledge structure and 
weak identity as a field of knowledge. This highlights the damage resulting from failing to 
recognise the paradigmatic conflict which is also evident elsewhere, even as the knowledge 
structure and identity of ecological economics has improved. 
 
2.3 Textbooks in Ecological Economics 
Since the articles by Røpke in the early 2000s, an important development has been the 
appearance of two large textbooks: Common and Stagl (2005) and Daly and Farley (2004, 
2011). As noted in Appendix A, textbooks are taken by Kuhn as key identifiers in the creation 
of paradigmatic scientific identity. They provide a reference point for students and instructors, 
and indicate the paradigmatic boundaries. An interesting aspect is then the extent to which 
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both textbooks make use of, and indeed rely upon, mainstream economics as their central 
reference point and include apologia for the role of neoclassical theory. 
Common and Stagl (2005: 15) are at pains to reassure their readers that their text, while 
critical, is totally consistent with going on to study neoclassical economics, and that: “Much 
of what you will learn from this book carries over into neoclassical economics”. Further 
reassurance is that: “There is much that the majority of neoclassical and the majority of 
ecological economists agree about” (ibid: 6). At the same time the paradigmatically 
conflicting core aspects of ecological economics concerning limits to growth are expounded 
(ibid: 236-246). Ecological economists are also noted to be sympathetic to arguments for 
‘seeking to change’ and ‘educating’ tastes; seemingly justified as necessary for improving 
individual and social health (ibid: 10). Thus, a core liberal aspect of neoclassical choice 
theory (i.e. the inviolability of individual preferences) appears to be overridden, although the 
grounds for doing so remain unclear and contradictory positions arise. For example, what 
‘social health’ means is never explained and, while highlighted in the introduction as central 
to distinguishing the ethical position of ecological economics from neoclassical economics, it 
never appears again in the textbook. Instead the text conforms to methodological 
individualism and later sections refer to ‘social capital’, i.e., making the social an investment 
with a rate of return. The text also conforms to neoclassical price and value theory. 
In the second textbook, Daly and Farley (2011: 407) warn that extending the market to 
all domains may destroy society, and they clearly advocate policies that would require strong 
top-down government. They recognise the limits to markets and many flaws in the 
neoclassical approach to economics; highlight the role of speculation in causing upward 
sloping demand curves; recognise producer control of consumer preferences via advertising 
and the ‘treadmill’ of consumerism; and question maximizing monetary value and the 
operation of allocation in actual markets. Like Common and Stagl, theirs is clearly not a 
standard neoclassical economic approach, but also remains embedded within the context of 
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that school. As a result critical elements can appear as mere side constraints, qualifying 
failures or Kuhnian anomalies relating to neoclassical economics. 
The conflict is that the anomalies overthrow the theory, so that attempting to explain 
actual economies relative to mainstream thought becomes highly problematic. Indeed, in a 
recent paper authored by Farley and Washington (2018)—but stated to be inclusive of Daly—
a defence is made against criticism by Pirgmaier (2017) that Daly’s steady-state theory is 
neoclassical economics in disguise. In doing so the authors explain their agreement with the 
flaws of neoclassical economics, deconstruct its validity and, as quoted earlier, criticise its 
increasingly frequent occurrence in this journal. However, despite all this, Daly and Farley 
(2011) state, in their textbook’s introduction, that: 
“the sections presenting basic micro and macroeconomics, as well as other parts 
discussing distribution and trade, are based on standard economics” (xvii), “[w]e accept 
more of traditional economics than we reject” (xviii), and that between neoclassical and 
ecological economics there is “basic agreement on the fundamental nature of the 
[economic] system” (xxiv). 
The underlying thesis is that price-making markets provide an efficient mechanism for 
resource allocation, and problems can be met by constraints. Macroeconomics is explained 
using neoclassical ISLM analysis and microeconomics using neoclassical marginal analysis. 
The two core improvements recommended are optimal scale to achieve sustainability 
followed by redistribution on the grounds of fairness. Optimal scale is defined, in neoclassical 
terms, as the point where the marginal benefits of additional growth are just equal to the 
marginal costs of the reduction in ecosystem function that this growth imposes. So, some sort 
of highly aggregated CBA is required, that would convert all values into money on the 
presumption of universal commensurability. Again, Daly and Farley may well recognise 
problematic aspects with such an approach, but the approach remains. 
17 
As neoclassical theory provides the basic reference point, to which problematic issues 
must refer, there then appears to be only one type of economy, the capitalist market economy. 
This limits how economics is to be understood. In particular, the paradigmatic boundaries to 
economics are stated very strongly in the “Note to Instructors”: 
“We have little patience with anti-economists who want to abolish money, who consider 
all scarcity to be an artificial social construct, or who think that all of nature’s services 
should be free.” (ibid: xviii) 
This is interesting, both for the mainstream prescriptive approach to defining what constitutes 
economics (i.e. money, scarcity, pricing Nature as service provider) and because of the 
apparent intolerance for, and even ridiculing of, the grounds for an alternative paradigm. 
Instructors are being told what is deemed unacceptable for the paradigmatic field. The 
important proviso ‘all’, in this sentence, could allow for consideration of alternative thinking, 
but seemingly as an addition, or more marginal concern, and with strong emphasis placed 
upon the danger of becoming an ‘anti-economist’.8 
This form of exposition limits the paradigm shifting potential that is clearly present in 
the critical work of Daly and Farley and their textbook. Indeed, they have declared: “We 
support Spash's (2012, 2013) call for socio-ecological economics, which we view as a return 
to the core principles of ecological economics” (Farley and Washington 2018: 448).9 The 
problems highlighted here are then indicative of the more general problem of conflicting 
commitments that arise when operating under the conditions of a paradigm shift. Such a shift 
requires leaving ones old paradigmatic training behind, but until a new paradigm is 
established the old lingers on, and in a Catch-22 prevents the paradigm shift. The process of 
paradigm change is far from quick or easy. 
                                                 
8 This position also seems to run foul of something the authors themselves have rather strongly rejected: being 
“obsessed with ideological purity”, a practice of those ecological economists who “attack any perceived 
deviation from their rigid views”, unjustified “purists” who claim to know “precisely how the current system 
works, and how to transition to an economy based on ecological sustainability and social justice” (Farley and 
Washington 2018: 448). 
9 Note, ‘we’ in their paper is explicitly stated to include Daly. 
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3. The Competition Amongst Paradigms 
Social Ecological Economics is an emergent paradigm, but has deep roots both in the work of 
Otto Neurath, William Kapp, Karl Polanyi and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (as will be 
explored below), as well as energetics of the 1800s (Martinez-Alier 1990). Franco (2018) has 
recently presented evidence for social energetics being an historical scientific metaparadigm 
(i.e., falling short of a Kuhnian paradigm but providing a common set of organising principles 
and ideas). The broad historical consensus he finds is the same ontological position that 
informs modern ecological economics, namely that: “economic processes are subject to 
natural laws—mainly thermodynamic laws—and, thus, a proper understanding of the social 
provisioning processes can only be achieved by a biophysical approach to economic science” 
(ibid: 200). That is, social provisioning is core to the economic problem and addressing it 
requires inclusion of the structural constraints imposed by biophysical reality as law like 
conditions and tendencies. 
In contrast, the neoclassical position on social provisioning is based upon the price-
making market paradigm. In the ‘normal’ science of economics this paradigm combines with 
the economic growth paradigm. However, their supporting collectives may also operate 
separately, and outside of neoclassical economics. Clarifying the two paradigms as distinct, 
and potentially separate, is important for understanding how they appear as influences 
affecting ecological economics. 
In today’s society, the links between economic growth and price-making markets might 
seem very strong both in practice and theory. In practice, capitalism is integrally linked to the 
use of such markets. Yet, the political and ideological commitment to a growth economy is 
also divorced from the need to commit to price-making markets as the main allocative 
institution, and capitalism is just one form of capital accumulating economy. Thus, growth 
has been a popular element of productivism in various forms of Marxist, political left and 
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state planned economic systems, where price-making markets are rejected in favour of fixed, 
administratively set prices or direct in-kind provisioning. In addition, although capitalism 
depends upon price-making markets the reverse is not true. 
In theory, mainstream economics seems to unite the two paradigms. However, there is 
nothing in neoclassical microeconomic (market) theory of the firm, or consumer demand 
theory, that necessitates growth. The idealised perfectly competitive firm of neoclassical 
economics has zero (not growing) profits in its long run equilibrium. There is also no 
necessary link of macroeconomic growth to microeconomic market theory. The idea that there 
is such a link has been encouraged by invasion of macroeconomics by ISLM analysis creating 
a school of neoclassical-Keynesianism that employs equilibrating market mechanisms 
modelled under mathematical formalist rules. Yet, not even prices are essential for 
macroeconomic models, a point noted by Georgescu-Roegen (2009 [1975]: 348) with respect 
to Solow’s growth model. Indeed he highlighted Solow’s hypocrisy in criticising Meadows et 
al. (1972) for not having prices in their limits to growth simulation model runs when they 
were absent from his own models! So, both in theory and practice the two distinct paradigms 
can be separated, i.e. economic growth without price-making markets and price-making 
markets without economic growth. 
The rabid popular support for economic growth is clearly hegemonic.10 This is 
recognised by the term ‘growthmania’ used by Daly (1992).11 The economic growth paradigm 
came to prominence as part of American foreign policy after World War II (Sachs 2015 
[1999]), and the development of macroeconomics by Keynes (1930, 1978 [1936]). Schmelzer 
(2015) provides a critical review of the rise of the growth paradigm in the international 
community and its conventional definition of economic growth as desirable, imperative, and 
                                                 
10 Hegemony is a political concept from Gramsci that means an ideological position that comes to dominate “to 
prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society—bringing about not only a unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, […] thus creating the hegemony of a 
fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.” (Gramsci, Hoare, and Smith 1971: 181-182) 
11 A term current in the degrowth literature and often attributed to Georgescu-Roegen, although he himself cites 
its origin as Ezra Mishan (Georgescu-Roegen 2009 [1975]: 349) 
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essentially limitless, given the political will to implement the ‘right policies’. He notes that 
this position (erroneously) assumes that: GDP adequately measures economic activity, growth 
is a panacea for a multitude of social and economic problems and growth is synonymous with 
progress, well-being and national power (ibid: 264). In the 1970s economic growth came in 
for considerable criticism on social, ecological and economic grounds (Hirsch 1977; 
Meadows et al. 1972; Easterlin 1974; Mishan 1969; Barkley and Seckler 1972; Lecomber 
1978; Schumacher 1973; Daly 1973; Scitovsky 1976). Daly has been a persistent critique of 
what he terms “neoclassical-Keynesian growthists” (Daly 2016), while requiring limits on 
scale. In more recent times, both the work of Georgescu-Roegen and Daly’s steady-state 
economy have appeared as part of the degrowth movement, supported by arguments from 
ecological economists (Kerschner 2010; Martinez-Alier et al. 2010; D'Alisa, Demaria, and 
Kallis 2014). 
The price-making market paradigm has received far less direct critical attention from 
ecological economists as an identifiable hegemonic ideology. It is promoted in slightly 
different forms by two schools: (i) Austrian economics and its modern neo-liberal ideological 
project, (ii) neoclassical economics. The latter is open to government intervention to correct 
market failures, on the basis that a perfect market can be actualised to achieve optimally 
efficient resource allocation. Austrian economists simply regard capitalist price-making 
markets as the only option for resource allocation in large scale human societies, and believe, 
rather contradictorily, both that entrepreneurs are key decision-makers and that consumers are 
sovereign (Fellner and Spash 2015). As neo-liberalism became a political reality, over the last 
thirty years or so (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009), neo-Austrian and neoclassical positions 
merged considerably—government intervention has been increasingly derided, despite 
general recognition of its necessity, while the ‘efficiency’ of the ‘free’ market price 
mechanism has been rhetorically promoted. Critical theoretical insights into the flaws of 
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price-making markets comes from the work of Polanyi (1944, 1957) and Kapp (1978 [1963]) 
and also the socialist calculation debate almost a century ago. 
Polanyi (1944) highlights problems of commodification and negative social 
repercussions of price-making market exchange due to the rise of capitalism. The restriction 
of economics to social provisioning through price-making market institutions is credited with 
creating an economics profession unable to understand the variety of social economic systems 
that have existed throughout human history (Polanyi 1977). However, Polanyi (1971) created 
a false dichotomy between formal economics (basically neoclassical price theory), and 
substantive economics (Spash 2019). He applied the latter to pre-capitalist economies where 
price-making markets were believed totally, or largely, absent. Polanyi (1971) based this 
division on a definition by Carl Menger, and he accepted the validity of marginalist 
(neoclassical) price theory as the explanation of a capitalist economy (Gemici 2015). He still 
argued that such an economic system was highly problematic in terms of its commodification 
of land, labour and money, and the repercussions it had both socially and environmentally. He 
therefore advocated a transformation from capitalism to a form of market Guild socialism, 
with resource and production prices fixed by administration (ibid). 
Reforming capitalism to prevent its collapse is what Polanyi (1944) calls the ‘double 
movement’, where exploitation and excess on the part of a minority (movement in one 
direction) become so extreme that some payback, to prevent political revolutionary change, 
has to be undertaken (counter movement). He does not advocate this movement, but rather 
sees it as a recurrent theme explaining why capitalism has not collapsed. The idea is 
developed extensively by the French Regulation School building from the 1976 book 
Régulation et crises du capitalism (Aglietta 2015 [1979]). A Polanyian double movement is 
evident in the rise of health and safety measures from the late 1800s, Fordism that allows 
workers to buy versions of the products they produce, the 1930s ‘New Deal’, and more 
generally post-war welfare economies that provide unemployment safety nets, pensions and 
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health care for ‘workers’ or sections of the underclass. Preserving capitalism in a welfare 
economy tradition avoids the capitalists’ other main option, which is authoritarianism and 
fascism under a securitised and militarised state, that cooperates with owners of capital or is 
constituted by factions of them. Whether the system is saved for a while by a New Deal or an 
authoritarian regime will not address the fundamental problems created by hegemonic price-
making markets under capitalism, and their conversion of everything into commodities, 
domination of private property rights over the commons, promotion of competition over 
cooperation and reduction of all values to money. The aim of capitalist markets is profitable 
returns, not protection of Nature, social justice or a good life for all. 
Kapp (1978 [1963]) makes clear another problem, that of social costs related to the 
environment and operations of any economy where competitive business enterprises exist, 
whether Western capitalist (e.g. USA) or Eastern centralised state productivist (e.g. former 
USSR). Kapp (ibid) rejects the idea of pollution as an ‘externality’ because this inaccurately 
describes what are deliberate acts of ‘cost shifting’ in the search for profit; a critique that 
corresponds to that of institutional economist Clark’s theories concerning the operation of the 
firm (Berger 2017: 99-114). The extent of such social costs and their non-monetary and 
incommensurable aspects means price-making markets can neither allocate resources as in the 
neoclassical textbooks, nor as under the formal economics of Polanyi, nor as claimed by neo-
liberals of the Austrian school. For a brief time environmental economists, in the neoclassical 
tradition (e.g., Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge 1970), also recognised the all pervasive nature of 
pollution—under a growth economy—making Adam Smith’s invisible hand into a cost-
shifting foot, giving a boot up the backside (Hunt and d'Arge 1973). However, this 
foundational critique was soon dropped completely as environmental economists reverted to 
treating pollution as a minor anomaly between two contracting parties that could be easily 
corrected via price adjustments. Paradigmatic conformity prevailed. 
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Pervasive social costs and Kapp’s critique destroy the claims of price-making markets 
to be efficient allocative mechanisms, but such markets also fail for other reasons. They 
allocate resources to those that need them least. Two examples are Sen’s (1986) work on 
famines, showing food being exported from famine struck regions, and Aventis developing a 
drug (eflornithine) that cures sleeping sickness, but selling it for removing unwanted facial 
hair in women rather than supplying sick, but financially poor, Africans (Daly and Farley 
2011: 151). Competitive markets are also notoriously wasteful of resources, e.g., food waste, 
built-in obsolescence, fashion, conspicuous consumption. Such problems contributed to their 
opposition during the 1920s and 1930s and the promotion of socialism. 
At that time, paradigmatic change was under discussion in the socialist calculation 
debate over the feasibility of a planned economy (see O'Neill 2011). In brief, one side was led 
by the Austrian and neo-liberal economists, Ludwig von Mises and Frederick Hayek, while 
opposing were socialists from neoclassical economics, such as Oskar Lange and Fred Taylor. 
In addition, the philosopher and economist Otto Neurath made his own distinct contributions 
supporting the socialist side. Lange’s pro-socialist contributions are typically regarded as key 
(see Lange 1936, 1937; Lange and Taylor 1938). Today readers may be surprised that they 
involved an elaborate model of neoclassical pricing, but with government intervention 
establishing prices by trial and error. Kapp also contributed to the debate with his 1936 thesis 
in German (partially translated by Berger 2016 Chapter 2), which raised the problem of social 
costs as a criticism of von Mises (his supervisor). Neurath’s contribution argued for a non-
market economy in-kind, and his work has been noted as highly relevant for modern 
ecological economists (O'Neill and Uebel 2015). Neurath was what would today qualify as an 
academic activist who, besides being a founder of the Vienna Circle, engaged in social 
housing projects and workers education in economics and wrote extensively on the economy 
(Uebel 2004). However, as an advocate of the abolition of money he would qualify as one of 
Daly and Farley’s ‘anti-economists’, which highlights the problematic character of their 
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mainstream prescriptive position (noted in Section 2.3) in denying alternatives to price-
making markets. 
Future oriented—post-growth/degrowth/steady-state—economics cannot afford to limit 
the search for new forms of exchange, minimising entropic effects, developing local 
economies and promoting social-ecological well-being. Questioning the role of money, 
scarcity and pricing while seeking alternatives is substantively present in growth critical 
research (Weiss and Cattaneo 2017; Nelson and Timmerman 2011). In addition, non-
monetary economies have existed throughout human history, and are an important aspect of 
economic and social anthropology, which also have traditions of questioning the 
conceptualisation of scarcity in mainstream economics (e.g., see Polanyi, Arensberg, and 
Pearson 1957). The mainstream approach also ignores female unpaid labour and the 
reproductive activities of women in making the economic system work in the first place, as 
highlighted by feminist economists and ecofeminists (Waring 1989; Salleh 2011). These are 
all areas that need to be given serious attention in the move to a new Social Ecological 
Economics paradigm. 
 
4. Paradigm Shift, Pragmatism and Passive Revolutions 
In debates over the paradigm shifting potential of ecological economics, several ISEE 
Presidents have denied a new unifying theory is possible and fallen back on ‘methodological 
pluralism’ inclusive of the economic mainstream (Costanza 1996; Costanza, Cumberland, et 
al. 1998; Norgaard 1989; Turner, Perrings, and Folke 1997). Despite recognising the 
foundational opposition between irreconcilable new and old paradigms they have been 
regarded as complimentary rather than exclusive (Klaasen and Opschoor 1991). The result is 
promotion of “a pragmatic approach that merges a rhetorical allegiance to the field's 
substantive pre-analytic vision with the use of mainstream methodologies that might have 
public policy purchase” (Anderson and M'Gonigle 2012: 40). 
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This is evident in advocacy of market mechanisms, monetary valuation, ‘natural capital’ 
and ecosystem services and their combination (e.g., Jansson et al. 1994; Costanza, d'Arge, et 
al. 1998; Farber, Costanza, and Wilson 2002). While the original intentions of those using 
such conceptualisations might have diverged from the mainstream (e.g., non-substitutable, 
non-monetary value, strong sustainability), the result has been to undermine ecological 
discourse and reinforce the price-making market paradigm (Spash and Aslaksen 2015). The 
rhetoric of efficiency, optimality, internalising externalities and ‘getting the prices right’ is 
adopted, so that ecological economics becomes indistinguishable from the mainstream. Thus, 
Turner, Perrings and Folke (1997) build their argument against ecological economics being a 
new paradigm on its use of the same methods, and prescribing the same policy measures, as 
environmental and resource economics. They regard its concern for biophysical systems as 
merely making it closer to resource economics.12 Yet, the biophysical foundation of 
ecological economics is core to it’s ontology and why it is not mainstream! 
In confronting the hegemonic mainstream paradigms, critique faces rejection or 
‘adjustment’ for conformity. Hence, environmentalism itself has been ‘mainstreamed’, 
producing policy proposals that support ‘business-as-usual’—sustainable development, 
ecological modernisation, Green growth, bioeconomy, circular economy, low carbon 
economy, new climate economy, and so on… The outcome is to preserve a capital 
accumulating, high-technology, growth economy, embedded in price-making markets that 
serve the interests of capital to maximise exchange value, not those of society to meet social 
needs. The history of capitalism reveals social movements that threaten those in power being 
neutralised by co-opting their leaders and creating internal division by separating-off the 
‘pragmatists’ from the radicals. Threatened elites create captured movements, adopting the 
language of the rebels and claiming to address their concerns. Those joining them can claim 
to be more ‘pragmatic’ and system saving than others due to their new connection to the 
                                                 
12 Charles Perrings was the fourth ISEE President. 
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powerful. Resulting change appears to empower the aggrieved, while not actually changing 
anything substantive in the social-economic structure of capitalism. Environmentalism to date 
appears to have been just such a passive revolution.13 
This is also reflected in ecological economics circling around the paradigms it rejects. 
Neoclassical economics often appears as a default set of theoretical ideas, simply because it 
has been paradigmatically dominant. A few examples follow to briefly highlight how this 
results in contradiction and paradigmatic restriction. Selected are two key areas regarded as 
having radical potential to support a paradigm shift: the steady-state economy and 
degrowth/post-growth. 
 
4.1 Capitalist Markets and the Steady-State Economy 
As has been made clear, Daly strongly opposes the economic growth paradigm and promotes 
a steady-state economy. However, in a recent exchange Daly (2016) makes explicit his 
support for ‘markets’, caricatures socialism as a relic of the Cold War and refers to Marxism 
as basically dead. While he approvingly references the neoclassical market socialist work of 
Lange and Taylor (1938), as matching what he means by markets, their work actually rejects 
price-making markets and promotes centrally planned prices. In contrast, Daly (2010) has 
confirmed his “preference for the market over centralised planning”. Elsewhere, Daly (2007) 
refers positively to “free markets” (p.18), “the decentralized system of pricing” (p.29) and, 
subject to two constraints, claims that “the market can always, determine allocatively efficient 
prices” (p.98), and is “able to effect exchange, [and] determine prices” (p.99). This appears to 
be straight forward advocacy of the price-making market paradigm in a neoclassical economic 
setting. 
                                                 
13 Passive revolution is a term associated with the writings of Gramsci (1971: 106-114) and is used 
here in terms of relating to the passive integration of subordinate segments of society while keeping 
them powerless. Potential revolutionary or oppositional intellectuals and leaders are absorbed into the 
system. See also Candeias (2011). 
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Daly consistently qualifies markets as “ecologically and socially constrained” (i.e., 
neoclassical market allocation subject to side constraints). He sometimes refers to these 
constraints collectively as ‘social values’. The ecological constraint relates to the scale of the 
economy—addressing the growth paradigm—not markets per se, but with implications for 
their form and operation. The social constraint is to control distribution of income as a central 
means of achieving fairer outcomes, i.e., more equitable votes in the market place. Arguments 
for redistribution have a long tradition in economics, and other traditional restrictions on 
price-making markets are also recognised by Daly. 
“Reliance on markets for allocation (now within prior ecological and distributional 
limits) is further constrained, even within traditional microeconomics, by opposition to 
monopoly, and restriction of market allocation to rival and excludable goods. Non-rival 
and non-excludable goods have long been recognized to require non-market allocation.” 
(Daly 2016: 27) 
So price-making markets can operate subject to a precondition (income distribution), a 
competitive requirement (no monopoly power) and for limited types of goods (rival, 
excludable). None of this is inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory, and allocative 
efficiency is then expected without further problems. As Daly (2007: 98) states: “Once these 
social values are reflected in constraints on the market, the allocative prices calculated by the 
market will reflect, and in a sense ‘internalize’ these external constraints”. Thus, Daly (1974) 
has long been an advocate of tradable permits markets, or cap-and-trade, even for the 
allocation of rights to give birth. Daly (2007: 109) has used the term “social market 
environmentalism” with respect to cap-and-trade, because he believes that “setting the cap at 
a sustainable level is a social-ecological decision”. 
On the basis of the above, Daly would clearly seem to accept neoclassical price theory. 
Pirgmaier (2017) has also detailed how neoclassical economics enters into aspects of Daly’s 
work on the steady-state economy. She argues that this makes it subject to the failings of 
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neoclassical theory and leads to the neglect of alternatives. Due to the resulting 
inconsistencies with Daly’s critical and realist ecological economics work, she believes the 
motivation has been misguided pragmatism: 
“Daly's pragmatic use of mainstream theory weakens the analytical and political 
contribution as well as the relevance of steady-state economics. It has neither convinced 
mainstream economists, nor led to the implementation of steady-state policies.” 
(Pirgmaier 2017: 59) 
In reply, Farley and Washington (2018) argue neoclassical economics is not part of the 
steady-state theory or indeed Daly’s real position (e.g., citing his ‘person in community’ 
concept).14 
The resulting defence is important for exposing a series of core conflicts between 
neoclassical and steady-state economics, with Farley and Washington (ibid) actually making 
their own devastating attack on the price-making market paradigm. However, this leaves them 
without justification for the role given to markets in the steady-state economy, which they 
then try to address. Unfortunately, this results in contradictions when they claim “voluntary 
market exchanges can generate Pareto improvements”, because their critique rules this out, 
especially due to “ubiquitous externalities” (corresponding to Kapp’s cost-shifting critique). 
Two non-neoclassical arguments also appear, one neo-Austrian using references to Hayek 
claiming markets promote individual choice, and the other pragmatic, claiming markets 
“already exist, are widely accepted, and should be used until something better emerges” (ibid: 
446). The obvious fallacy is that neo-Austrian economics created neo-liberalism with Hayek a 
core player (Mirowski and Plehwe 2009), and the resulting promotion of capitalist price-
making markets has been, and is being, used to both deny and prevent the emergence of 
alternatives (the attempt to enforce a paradigmatic Catch-22). 
                                                 
14 Ziegler (2007) has noted the contradiction of promoting the person in community concept alongside a green 
GDP measure. Another move that seems based on pragmatism, as apparently confirmed by Daly and Cobb 
(2007). 
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Indeed, adopting market capitalism would result in adopting capital accumulation and 
growth, while markets do not need capitalism (e.g., Lange and Taylor 1938). Market form is 
not singular. The institutional context, constraints and means of price calculation are central to 
designing markets for social and ecological needs. Ecological constraints appeal to 
understanding social provisioning based on a biophysical approach to economic science 
(Franco 2018: 200). Daly applies this with the concern for scale. Additionally qualitative 
ecological issues (e.g., chemicals, radiation, genetic modification) should be added, i.e. type 
not just scale. The orthodox contention is that such constraints could be set and then markets 
(under price-making capitalist conditions) can operate. However, these adjustment totally 
change the operation of the market and its basis. As Franco (2018: 201) puts it: 
“The allocative approach of mainstream economics does not support social energetics as 
a foundation and, thus, competes with the biophysical approach both philosophically 
and as a source of influence on policy makers.” 
That is, the price-making market fails to address the ecological issues as recognised by 
ecological economics as foundational. The issue here is not just that the mainstream has an 
unrealistic model, but that markets are instituted process and placing them in a capitalist 
context has entropic consequences that neither it nor ecological economics can reconcile. As 
Anderson and M'Gonigle (2012: 42) explain: 
“markets driven by capital needs are designed for one end, to seek returns to capital, 
that is, to maximize ‘exchange values’ that can grow the quantum of capital. These 
markets must grow by their nature because the point of any investment of capital is to 
return more capital to it, and they do this only through the exchange process itself. 
Exchange activity (and all its entropic effects) is the basis of their mode of operation, 
and the more such activity, the more that capital is generated.” 
In addition, price-making markets require commensurable commodities and this conflicts with 
ecological constraints, as evident in biodiversity offset markets (Spash 2015). 
30 
Other critiques have also pointed out the impossibility of a steady-state market 
capitalism because of the necessity for accumulation (Smith 2010), and expected significant 
decline, if not total disappearance, of productivity gains due to the move from quantitative to 
qualitative growth, e.g., expanding the service sector (Trainer 2016). Additionally, Blauwhof 
(2012) doubts the capitalist social relations of production would allow the steady-state to 
achieve stability and social justice. The arguments from steady-state economics would then 
seem to offer a radical critique of capitalist markets, rather than supporting their constrained 
use. 
The radical critique also appears left implicit and undeveloped in the argument that 
specific goods can be objectively identified by their characteristics (i.e., rival, excludable) that 
select them for trading in price-making markets. First, accepting this means all other goods 
would need to be supplied by unspecified alternative institutions. The door opens to central 
planning, socialism and other forms of social provisioning. Second, markets as instituted 
processes may be designed in different ways. Capitalists attempt to create ‘new goods’ 
(commodification) with the necessary market characteristic (e.g. rival, excludable) for market 
trading—making the formerly untradeable tradable, e.g., carbon, biodiversity. Alternative 
institutional designs for provisioning could be radically different with administered prices or 
limited in ways beyond those so far considered. Third, capitalist markets are integrated with 
mechanisms enforcing growth. However, in actual economies counter mechanisms can allow 
non-growing firms to exist (Leonhardt, Juschten, and Spash 2017). This indicates the potential 
for alternative market design to create the conditions for non-growing firms. Fourth, actual 
markets are not well explained by neoclassical theory, and determing a role for markets does 
not require adopting their paradigmatic positions. In summary, the paradigm shifting potential 
of the steady-state economy is being denied by adoption of market capitalism and neoclassical 
theory in support of the price-making market paradigm. 
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4.2 Degrowth and Post-Growth 
The academic degrowth movement has been heavily associated with ecological economics, 
e.g., via former ISEE President Martinez-Alier and members of his institute in Barcelona. 
Daly’s steady-state economy has been described as the ultimate, if aspirational, objective of 
degrowth (Kerschner 2010), and the Barcelona degrowth researchers invited Farley to write 
an entry on the steady-state economy in their definitional book (D'Alisa, Demaria, and Kallis 
2014). The concise entry makes no reference to the institutions governing resource allocation 
or production in such an economy nor operations of markets. Degrowth allies itself with 
Marxist political ecology and radical critiques of capitalist market economies. There would 
then seem to be a totally unrecognised and unarticulated conflict with the standard reliance of 
steady-state economics on (constrained) capitalist markets. 
Another apparent paradigmatic inconsistency is the role of growth itself. A common 
argument that appears is the necessity of growth for the poor. For example, Kerschner (2010: 
548) argues, “that the rich North will need to de-grow in order to allow for some more 
economic growth in the poor South”. Kerschner’s paper is endorsed by Martinez-Alier et al. 
(2010) running counter to their claim that: “The de-growth movement vigorously supports the 
‘post-development’ critique” (ibid: 1745). That critique rejects the use of economic growth to 
intervene in other countries and highlights its basis in a narrowly defined concept of poverty 
that ignores cultural diversity. For example, Sachs (2015 [1999]) differentiates the materially 
poor into what can be described as living frugally, suffering deprivation and living under 
systems of institutionally constructed economic scarcity. Consistent with degrowth, traditional 
societies have economic systems of social provisioning that are structured on frugality and 
sufficiency, while interventions for the purposes of economic growth (as development) create 
deprivation due to the destruction of sustainable livelihoods, land grabbing, resource 
exploitation, industrialisation of agriculture and environmental pollution. A growth critical 
perspective on poverty, more consistent with post-development, is expressed in a later paper 
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by Kallis, Kerschner and Matinez-Alier (2012), and elsewhere (Demaria et al. 2013). 
However, other prominent academics, associating with degrowth, persist with claims of the 
necessity for growth to address poverty. 
For example, Tim Jackson, is an ecological economist engaging with the degrowth 
community who argues for a post-growth society. He also appears in the aforementioned 
degrowth edited volume (D'Alisa, Demaria, and Kallis 2014), with a chapter entitled “New 
Economy”, that proposes such a transition based on text taken directly from his book 
Prosperity Without Growth. Yet, in that book he states a “key message” is that: “There is no 
case to abandon growth universally” (Jackson 2009a: 41). Again growth is validated as a 
means to alleviate ‘poverty’. What seems to go unrecognised is that promoting the expansion 
of the economic growth model to the ‘poor’ means spreading the capital accumulating system 
from a minority to the majority of the world’s population, decimating any anti-growth 
position. The problematic ‘growth=development’ ideology of progress then comes in through 
the backdoor. In Jackson’s case his report/book could more honestly be retitled Prosperity 
After Growth. 
That the post-growth service based ‘new economy’, envisioned by Jackson, conflicts 
with capitalism is something he felt compelled to address when converting his report (Jackson 
2009b) into a book (Jackson 2009a). He added a short section addressing capitalism (Jackson 
2009a: 197-202), but this makes extremely disappointing reading and goes nowhere. Indeed, 
he tries to rhetorically avoid the issue that his ‘new economy’ might either endorse or destroy 
capitalism by using a Star Trek joke (It’s capitalism, but not as we know it), and asking 
rhetorically “Does it really matter?”. Anderson and M'Gonigle(2012: 43) point out that 
growth is treated by Jackson as an optional add-on (a position repeated by Bill McKibben in 
the book’s introduction), rather than inherent to capitalism, where its absence is, by definition, 
a crisis. 
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In terms of GDP, Jackson also believes that: “Whether it deserves pride of place in a 
new ecological macro-economics is an open question” (Jackson, 2009a: 123-124). So what is 
left of opposition to the growth paradigm? Pirgmaier (2017) notes, as “highly problematic”, 
Jackson’s reliance on the neoclassical production function approach for explaining 
macroeconomics. In a similar vein, Morgan (2017: 169) explains how Jackson and Peter 
Victor have inadvertently employed a macroeconomic modelling approach that “contributes 
to the reproduction of the problematic position of ecological concerns within dominant ways 
of conceiving economics”. 
 
4.3 Formalist Inclusion 
What the above cases reveal is how problems are formalised for inclusion in an existing 
theoretical frame that makes them conform to rejected paradigmatic positions, so creating 
contradictions. That the capitalist economic system depends upon expropriating and 
privatizing wealth from those parts of the social and natural world that lie outside the market 
sphere means that countering these acts undermines the system and its political economy. As 
McMahon (1997: 168) explains: 
“Neoclassical economic solutions to inefficiency often mirror the traditional liberal 
solution to inequality. Both say 'bring them in': bring women into the public sphere; 
bring the environment (and pollution) efficiently into the market by full market 
accounting. Market rationality is seen as the solution. But such solutions of bringing 
those for whom the system doesn't work more fully into the (market or political) system 
as equals cannot work because it fails to understand how the system is dependent on 
their being outside: the spheres of women and nature are preconstructed as unequal 
outside the marketplace.” 
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Formalist growth based approaches to quantifying poverty miss the point, because the people 
saved from “poverty”, become the oppressed living in the economy of material scarcity 
measured by money. 
Ecofeminism similarly notes the divorce between the formalist approaches to equality, 
based on voting rights and income, and the issue of social justice and discrimination in family 
and work life. Thus, Bauhardt (2014) argues that, whether Green growth, Green New Deal, 
degrowth, or solidary economy, the gendered labour functioning of the system has been 
ignored. The formalist approach results in denial of dependency and interdependency, which 
hides the transfers from female labour (care work and reproduction of the social system). The 
same applies to Nature. Thus, monetising, pricing and commodifying Nature formalises and 
legitimises its exploitation rather than addressing the structural causes of that exploitation. 
Along the lines of Gramsci’s passive revolution the content of counter hegemonic 
discourse becomes co-opted into the mainstream. Actors adjust their discourses and practices 
in the process of adapting and reproducing neo-liberal hegemony. In this way, many ecologist 
and conservationists have lost their own language and concepts, which have been replaced by 
those of the market place and financier (Spash and Aslaksen 2015). For any alternatives to 
offer real change requires that they are not merely passive revolutions that renew the 
problematic norms of existing structures. This is also why the agenda for the next thirty years 
must move beyond discourses about reforming a failing social and economic system that 
creates ecological crises, and pretending there are no real alternative types of economies. 
 
5. The Agenda for the Next Thirty Years 
In New Foundations for Ecological Economics some basic aspects of ontology, epistemology, 
methodology and ideology are advanced (Spash 2012a); here the focus is on outlining the 
establishment of the new paradigm in economic science. The case has already been made that 
the economic mainstream must be left behind and the two paradigmatic theories it advances—
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economic growth and price-making markets—overthrown. Changing economics is necessary 
because it fails to address the reality of the economic system and neither can it address the 
transformation to alternative economies. 
In terms of the research agenda, there are three aspects to the work ahead. First, 
understanding the real operation of the current system is necessary and that means descriptive 
and explanatory realism. The production sector today is comprised of many international 
private and state owned corporations, monopolies and oligopolies, varieties of small to 
medium enterprises, the unpaid reproductive and care work of women, and small scale 
subsistence. Deductive mathematical optimal models of non-existent competitive firms are 
irrelevant. Real institutional arrangements of conventions, norms, rules and regulations create 
the context and structure of reproductive operations. The psychology and sociology of 
consumption must similarly be realist and not some fantasy of consumer sovereignty. The 
need for change requires understanding how past systems have operated, and the current 
system is operating. This means an economic theory covering common conceptual aspects 
such as money, markets, pricing, work and consumption, but from a realist perspective that 
includes the role in the economy of the non-monetary, non-market, unpriced and unpaid. 
Second, social ecological transformation of the economy means alteration of the current 
institutional and social relations of production. The change ahead is not a minor price 
adjustment, but a major transformation in both physical and social structure. Human induced 
climate change, and its dominant trend towards global warming, “has rendered mainstream 
economics so wanting that a new economic paradigm is needed” (Anderson and M'Gonigle 
2012: 40), but it is just one environmental problem amongst many. The systemic problem is 
cost-shifting. What human induced climate change does is to highlight the need for systemic 
change. The impossibility of addressing Greenhouse Gas emissions without removing fossil 
fuels from the economy means the end of the historical form of the industrialised economy. 
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A positive and conscious change therefore faces all the powerful and vested interest 
groups that benefit from a fossil fuel economy and requires understanding of power 
relations—relating to the State, organised labour and corporate capitalists and related elites. 
This implies going beyond the growth theoretic analysis of political economy to theories of 
more radical social and institutional change (Buch-Hansen 2018). Social-ecological 
transformation requires research on alternative economies and ways of living (not 
paradigmatically excluding them), and developing policies that encourage and create them 
(not deny their potential because they have not been actualised). 
Third, there is the need for alternative visions, a set of utopian views about idealised 
social, ecological and economic relations. Plural values, community, harmony, care, love, 
cultural diversity, tolerance, inclusion and a meaningful life for all. Allowance for human-
Nature relations, doing good for Nature not just exploiting it as ‘services’ and ‘capital’, but 
also Nature-Nature relations and Nature with autonomy from humans. Utopian visions that 
are not those of the current hegemony and its dominant paradigms—everlasting economic 
growth, materialism, ever advancing technologies, always living beyond the limits with 
dreams of living forever. The alternative social ecological utopias should be scientifically 
based in terms of being realisable, not science fiction nor purely romantic. Scientific utopias 
in this sense act as inspirational positive visions of the future. They also need to be part of the 
research agenda. 
The research agenda must be open to varieties of economic structure—economies not 
‘the economy’—and alternative institutional arrangements. As Anderson and M'Gonigle 
(2012: 40) state: “It is one thing to criticize growth on the basis of the science of 
thermodynamics; it is another to situate the sources of that growth in the real world of 
political economy”. The rejection of the growth paradigm means addressing an alternative 
structure for economies that removes capital accumulation, competition over resources, 
institutions of profit seeking, and surplus creation and destruction (i.e. the consumer society). 
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Economics is to be understood as social provisioning in accord with biophysical reality. In 
addition, economics has a role in relation to the forms of resource allocation and what in 
mainstream economics is reduced down to individual choice. In both social provisioning and 
resource allocation the relations of production are central. This means power relations are also 
an explicit consideration. The economy is an aspect of the social. Economics is political 
economy. 
In terms of the price-making market paradigm I have highlighted the long standing 
critiques. Prices are not formed as in economic textbooks. Cost-shifting is a central element 
operative in competitive surplus-accumulating market economies, and more generally where 
competition and individual gain are promoted. The structure of the actual economy and 
resulting prices involve competing interests. The last century has witnessed the rise and 
dominating roles of the corporation, the industrial-military complex and, in recent decades, 
the financial sector. Once the price-making market paradigm is seen as a fiction hiding the 
real mechanisms of resource allocation, involving political power and cost-shifting, then 
planning social provisioning becomes an explicit concern. 
Two major positions on alternative forms of economies go back to the socialist 
calculation debate. One overarching form is market socialism, where prices are not made in 
the market power game but by administrative intervention, with the mechanisms of market 
allocation still employed but not dominant. The other is an economy with social provisioning 
in-kind, such as social housing, national health care, free education, libraries, museums, 
energy, water, infrastructure and so on. Variations on and alternatives to markets are broadly 
recognised as necessary, but which form under what circumstances remains under researched 
and contestable. In-kind provisioning is consistent with the role in ecological economics given 
to needs and satisfiers (Rauschmayer and Omann 2017) and a tradition back to Neurath 
(O'Neill and Uebel 2015; O'Neill 2011). Research developing needs and satisfiers as a central 
aspect in social provisioning could connect to allowing for cultural diversity in a post-
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development context (Sachs 2015 [1999]). The post-development critique of growth and its 
approach to poverty should be made common knowledge amongst ecological economists to 
avoid equating poverty to income or Western materialist approaches. 
Another key aspect of social provisioning is the material and energy flow through the 
economy and here the work on social metabolism is of central import (e.g., Krausmann 2017; 
Gerber and Scheidel 2018). This links to the historical metaparadigm of ecological economics 
(Franco 2018), and its modern ontological foundations (Spash 2012a). It also relates to the 
type of society desired and answering the questions of production of what, for whom and for 
what ends? Production today is highly skewed and inequitably distributed as is income, 
wealth and power. Biophysical reality means confronting limits and rejecting the mythical 
utopian promise of the growth paradigm (i.e., everyone can be a materialist at the level of the 
average American). 
Constraints also raise the issue of sustainable populations and their treatment across 
time and space. Intergenerational ethics became encapsulated in the weak vs. strong 
sustainability debate and the formalised discussion of sustainability, in terms of resource 
substitution, scarcity and time preferences, with a focus on discounting. In this way the 
mainstream placed intergenerational ethics into the growth and price-making market 
paradigms. Engaging with this approach means mainstream paradigmatic conformity prevails 
and broader understanding of ethics and value is excluded. The is exemplified by the whole 
economic discourse on climate change (Spash and Gattringer 2017; Spash 2002). Rejecting 
the hegemonic paradigms means taking the role of ethics in economics seriously. 
A similar problem relates to temporal changes in ecosystems. The mainstream position 
either ignores the importance of ecosystems or claims changes in ecosystems can be captured 
via the effect on human well-being expressed as money values. The first is a strategic 
adoption of ignorance, while the second is impossible and highly misleading. The spatio-
temporal aspects of change, scale of impacts and their irreversibility all affect the evaluation 
39 
of and policy response to ecosystems change. Future research must remain focussed on the 
paradigmatic distinctions here and re-establish their formerly recognised implications for 
policy (e.g., Norton 1995). 
In the consideration and development of alternative economies the role of money and 
unpaid work must be addressed both in their current forms and in terms of how different types 
of economies and economic relations can and do operate. This contrasts with imposing the 
price-making market paradigm, where the role of money must be spread to everything and 
everything done must be treated as paid work. Such an approach is the imposition of a 
singular type of economy on all else—Polanyi’s (1977) economistic fallacy—along with its 
problematic conceptualisation of work and life. As with the attempted spread of 
commodification and pricing Nature, this ignores value pluralism, incommensurability and 
alternative ethical approaches. 
Non-monetary life and livelihoods should be researched (e.g., Nelson and Timmerman 
2011), and regarded as part of Social Ecological Economic understanding. The variety of 
social relations must be understood as inclusive of gift and reciprocity as explored in social 
anthropology. Contra Polanyi, this substantive aspect of the economy is relevant for all 
economies and understanding of their social structure (Spash 2019). Social relations also raise 
the need for social theory, which is totally absent from mainstream economics due to its 
reliance on methodological individualism. This would also reinforce the need for addressing 
and researching the roles of different forms of political power (e.g., Stör 2017), and their 
associated institutions. 
A reaction against the idea of this emergent paradigm will inevitably be that it is another 
top-down imposition of a restricted and dogmatic science. This could be so if the approach 
failed to maintain elements of critical thinking. The vision is of a paradigm in the social 
sciences that is interdisciplinary, integrative of knowledge and coherent (Gerber and 
Steppacher 2012), but neither dogmatic nor eclectic pluralism. There is also an important 
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aspect of being an emancipatory science in the critical realist sense of scientific understanding 
having a purpose (Collier 1994), and that is why Social Ecological Economics seeks 
transformation. There is no question of apathy about rejecting the growth and price-making 
market paradigms. Academic activism is also highly relevant for transformation and the new 
paradigm must help inform degrowth and post-growth and other similar social movements. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
For over fifty years the systemic and structural problems of the economic system with respect 
to the environment and society have been recognised—increasing inequity, social division, 
exclusion of ‘others’, loss of biodiversity, mass species extinction, pollution of land, air and 
water, and resource wars. The response has been: 
“the paradigm of the necessary and sufficient role of innovation, growth, adaptation, 
evolution, and the centrality of new and emerging sciences and technologies such as life 
science and biotechnology. […] the main solutions have long since been tagged to a 
paradigm of industrial growth and competitiveness. This ‘paradigm’, furthermore, is 
directly linked to a macro-economic outlook that is now causing havoc across European 
societies.” (Rommetveit et al. 2013: 76-77) 
The arguments against this and its economic form in the economic growth and price-making 
market paradigms are core to ecological economics and its raison d’être. Yet, even within the 
supposedly more radical degrowth/post-growth movement and steady-state theory we see 
contradictory and conflicted support for the hegemonic paradigms. In ecological economics, 
the combination of New Resource Economists with New Environmental Pragmatists blocks 
the emergence of a new paradigm, or at least delays realisation of its full potential. There also 
appears to have been a strong ideological bias against considering alternative forms of social 
provisioning. Market socialism was the commonly accepted conclusion of the socialist 
calculation debate and needs serious reconsideration along with non-market alternatives. 
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Understanding past and present forms of economies and structuring alternatives requires 
openness to potentialities. 
Ecological economics consists of long established ideas that form a conceptual core that 
can be specified, along with what is peripheral and what stands in opposition. That core 
combines ecological understanding, social structure and a redefined economics. Important 
theoretical insights then arise, such as the dependence of social and economic structures on 
biophysical reality, impossibility of equilibrium theories, the role of ethics and plural values, 
institutions as social structures and the connection of economics with politics and power. It 
creates a theoretical body of understanding that builds from, but is fundamentally different to, 
preceding theories. 
A paradigm shift requires explicit articulation, identifying what is different from the 
past and being clear about what must be left behind, as well as social commitment on the part 
of the community. This is not merely a different story, or alternative perspective, in some 
competition for the best social construction, but rather a paradigmatically different theory and 
social ontology than exists in mainstream economics and one that challenges its continued 
existence. As Kuhn discovered, humans can choose to commit to theories for a range of 
strategic and social reasons (e.g., careers, power, money, prestige), that bear no relationship to 
understanding their objects of study. However, the scientific validity of a theory is not based 
on who believes it, but lies in how it matches up to reality, and that is why maintaining belief 
in and pragmatic support for unrealistic economic theories contributes to on-going social 
ecological crises and helps create new ones. 
In terms of what future economies might be like there are numerous options including: 
planning, government ownership of the means of production, socialist economies, 
communitarian and local community economies, caring economies, solidarity economies, 
soviets and anarchistic communes, and so on. Social and economic systems require 
reproductive processes and involve unpaid maintenance, gift and reciprocity. However, today 
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all this is ignored and denied under financial, corporate and neo-liberal domination of actual 
economies, despite the resulting social and environmental problems they create. More than 
ever alternative economies and forms of social provisioning are necessary that break the 
hegemony of growth and price-making market paradigms. Needs can be met through in-kind 
provision for people not profit. The variety and form of resulting institutions, including the 
role of markets and their form, is part of the research agenda. However, the change required 
involves a scientific paradigm shift in economic thinking, and that means a struggle to 
overcome narrow prescriptive definitions of economics that play to hegemonic forces and 
outdate ideological divisions. 
Social, ecological and economic crises are integrated and cannot be addressed by the old 
unrealistic paradigms or their pragmatic use. The next thirty years require a major social-
ecological transformation of the economy based on an economics that studies and understands 
actual economic institutions, power relationships and social provisioning systems, but also 
recognises the unfulfilled potentialities of alternative social and economic systems and seeks 
to explore and actualise them. The conditions for change are already present as the failures of 
the current system become increasingly recognised. Crises evidence the failures of 
understanding and the practical inadequacy of knowledge. The attempts to cooperate with, 
apologise for and infiltrate into existing hegemonic paradigms have at best achieved passive 
revolutions that fail to address structural problems, and, by playing to existing power 
groupings, do nothing to contribute to changing the substantive operations of actual 
economies. They have revalidated not invalidated the irrelevant discourses of mainstream 
economics, and supported marginalisation of radical critique. The change outlined here 
requires creating the necessary conditions that can sustain new ideas, which means 
refocussing the journal, textbooks, teaching and conferences to exclude redundant and 
rejected theories and invalidated knowledge, rather than supporting and including them under 
the guise of pluralism and pragmatism. There is nothing to be gained and much to loose from 
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continuing to maintain the misguided belief that there is some fruitful discussion to be had 
with those supporting the very system ecological economists oppose and aim to totally 
transform. The time of passive revolutions is over. Now is the time to fully implement the 
long promised revolutionary paradigm shift! 
 
********* 
 
Appendix A: What is a Paradigm? 
According to Kuhn (1970 [1962]) a paradigm is more than a theory and involves: how future research 
in a field should proceed, which problems are to be tackled, what are the appropriate methods for 
‘solving’ problems and what would constitute an ‘acceptable solution’? Kuhn recognised the 
importance of the scientific community in answering such questions and defining knowledge in a 
given field, and this stimulated the development of the sociology of science and boosted 
constructivism (e.g., science and technology studies). Thus, a paradigm combines scientific theory and 
practice along with community beliefs and institutions (conventions, norms, rules and regulations) 
affecting content and conduct. 
In periods of normal science, a particular research tradition is institutionalised, by combining 
rules and standards for scientific practice with accepted examples of actual scientific practice, and 
established through accredited publications. Kuhn (1970 [1962]: 10) specifies books and textbooks as 
the publications that “define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field for succeeding 
generations of practitioners”, while also identifying problems left open to be resolved. Today, in many 
fields, peer reviewed journals would also be added as fulfilling this definitional role, with Editors 
acting as gate-keepers of what is designated as legitimate knowledge. In this way a scientific field and 
its boundaries are established. 
In Kuhn’s approach a dominant paradigm arises to rule over a field of knowledge. As Chalmers 
(1999: 108) summarises: “A mature science is governed by a single paradigm. The paradigm sets the 
standards for legitimate work within the science it governs. It coordinates and directs the ‘puzzle 
solving’ activity of the groups of normal scientists who work within it.” The sociological aspects mean 
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commitment by the relevant scientific community to their shared ontology, assumptions, theoretical 
beliefs, values, instruments and techniques. This makes paradigms inherently conservative in Khun’s 
approach, because they define what unites a scientific community and what is ‘normal’ in the 
scientific practice of a given field of knowledge. Contrary to Karl Popper, Kuhn argues that, in periods 
of normal science, scientists avoid novelty in facts and theories and defend the paradigm using 
auxiliary hypotheses. Scientific revolutions, or paradigm shifts, only occur when anomalies become 
overwhelming. A period of revolutionary crisis then arises, and is resolved when a new paradigm 
attracts enough scientists and the old one is abandoned. 
There are various problems with Kuhn’s approach, of which only a few can be briefly 
mentioned. An individuals’ choice to commit to a paradigm does not define the practical adequacy of 
knowledge. That is, the scientific grounds on which an existing paradigm is regarded as better than its 
rivals is distinct from sociological acceptance. Additionally, a distinction can be drawn between social 
construction of concepts and theories and the evaluation of those theories against reality. Strong social 
constructivism denies there is any valid basis for such evaluation, ironically by universalising and over 
generalising the role of socialisation. Kuhn rejected such an extreme relativism. However, he 
problematically claims paradigms are incommensurable, which would prevent scientists rationally 
comparing them; a position broadly rejected by the fact that new science tends to communicate with 
and build from previous knowledge. How science is meant to progress is also contentious in Kuhn’s 
theory. A variation is that of Imre Lakatos who defines a defended ‘hard core’ where progress is meant 
to occur and a protective belt which is contested (see Chalmers 1999). 
Kuhn is concerned with natural sciences and as a result the power to progress in solving 
quantitative problems, while qualitative explanation might diminish. The quantitative focus is highly 
problematic for both natural and social sciences, and the importance of qualitative information for 
evolutionary and economic systems was something Georgescu-Roegen (2009 [1979], 1971) was at 
pains to point out. The definition of science as problem solving is also narrow and, for example, 
downplays the role of descriptive explanation and interpretation. Social sciences engage in 
hermeneutics, and the search for new and deeper concepts, while natural sciences tend to work with 
established and more stable interpretations. This is an aspect of the object of study, the structure of say 
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the phenomenon of gravity is not changing, while our interpretations may do so. Social structure can 
and does change, but not as fast as some constructivists would like to claim, nor in most circumstances 
due to simply studying an object. Indeed, deliberate attempts to change social structure prove hard to 
achieve and may take a generation or two. Social science researchers do aim to use knowledge to 
change the structure of the object of study (e.g. the economy) and in doing so hope to improve the 
human condition. In contrast, natural sciences have traditionally worked to understand the structure of 
their objects of study, taken as given, working within those structural constraints to achieve outcomes 
for human ends. 
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